The Role of Fiscal Policy in Spain from 2007 to 2010 and the Influence of Aggregate Public Spending on Economic Growth by Cabasés i Piqué, Ma. Àngels & Ridao Martín, Joan
Open Journal of Business and Management, 2013, 1, 59-75 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojbm.2013.13009 Published Online October 2013 (http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojbm) 
The Role of Fiscal Policy in Spain from 2007 to 2010 and 
the Influence of Aggregate Public Spending on Economic 
Growth 
M. Àngels Cabasés Piqué1*, Joan Ridao Martín2,3 
1Department of Applied Economics, University of Lleida, Lleida, Spain 
2Department of Constitutional Law and Political Science, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain 
3Faculty of Law, ESADE, Universitat Ramon Llull, Barcelona, Spain 
Email: *macabases@econap.udl.cat, jridao@ub.edu 
 
Received July 26, 2013; revised September 9, 2013; accepted September 18, 2013 
 
Copyright © 2013 M. Àngels Cabasés Piqué, Joan Ridao Martín. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Com-
mons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work 
is properly cited. 
ABSTRACT 
In the early stages of the crisis that is currently affecting the Spanish economy, the fiscal policy that excessively re-
sorted to automatic stabilizers helped overwhelm the deficit and public debt. In this context, first, in this paper we ana-
lyse the trend and variation rate of government revenue as well as expenditure on final consumption and government 
investment in the last 15 years in relation to the business cycle. In another vein, we also explore and quantify the impact 
of the countercyclical policies provided from 2007 to 2010 and their impact on the tax burden, which enables us to 
evaluate the stabilizing role of fiscal policy and thus highlight its fragility. Second, given the challenges of budgetary 
stability facing the Spanish economy, and always based on the above analysis in which we display the limited room for 
fiscal manoeuvre, we present the effects of aggregate public spending in a systematic and quantified way as well as its 
composition as an instrument of fiscal policy. In this framework, a long term stable equilibrium relationship is studied, 
based on two bivariate models that cointegrate econometrically, that is to say, to estimate models for error correction for 
cointegrated nonstationary series (and ultimately able to anticipate the evolution of the Spanish economy), we estimate 
and assess the contribution of spending on investment and government final consumption on aggregate output as well as 
its differential effect, to assess the concrete impact of the measures applied and ultimately the role of fiscal policy im-
plemented in the early years of the crisis and those that will be designed in the future. Finally, the main conclusion 
given by the model of behaviour for the final consumption expenditure of general government and GDP, is the exis-
tence of delayed adverse effects on the rate of growth of public spending on growth rate GDP. Taking into account the 
response function of GDP for a boost in public consumption, we estimate that with a lag of two years, an increase in the 
growth rate of public consumption is falling in the rates of change of aggregate output. Moreover, we can also deduce 
that the delayed effects of the rate of decline in public investment have a negative impact on economic growth. 
 
Keywords: Estimation; Time Series; Government Revenue and Final Consumption of the Government 
1. Introduction: Going through the Worst 
Crisis in Decades 
During the year 2008, we were exceptional spectators of 
the international economic deterioration and the first 
global crisis of the 21st century that apparently origi- 
nated in the explosion of subprime mortgages in the 
United States in 2007. From that moment, a period of 
deep turbulence began that entailed the loss of solvency 
throughout the entire international financial system. Later, 
as we know, this situation worsened due to the serious 
challenges that many European and American financial 
institutions faced, regardless of their size. This situation 
led to various governments and central banks intervening 
by providing huge resources for their restructuring. 
In Spain, the curbed financial activity had an immedi- 
ate transfer on the productive economy as well as fami- 
lies, who saw their access to credit drastically reduced. 
However, this impact was not the only cause of the eco- 
nomic crisis, given that there also were serious structural 
imbalances arising in the growth period before the crisis, 
especially after the adoption of the single European cur- 
rency. This growth model was based first of all on the *Corresponding author. 
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drive of domestic demand, which went hand in hand with 
a sharp increase in funding requirements and a high cur- 
rent account deficit with the outside world, as well as the 
largest trade deficit among developed countries, since as 
early as 2007 9% of GDP was exceeded. 
Specifically, the Spanish economic growth pattern was 
essentially based on the push for real estate and services, 
with little added value, in a context of low interest rates 
and a growing demand for low-skilled labour. Moreover, 
we have to take into account the absence of sufficient 
productive capitalization and investment in research and 
innovation, which has negatively influenced productivity 
and market competitiveness. 
Thus, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is permanently 
located at the epicentre of the debate on economic policy 
[1-3]. Eurozone governments initially responded to the 
negative outlook of the recession with various counter- 
cyclical fiscal measures, under the European Economic 
Recovery Plan1. In this context, it can be said that the 
effects on public finances were negative across the board 
as a result of the sharp fall in government revenues and 
increased spending, especially those designed to mitigate 
the effects of the crisis and to nourish the aid for the 
banking system and other sectors of the economy. From 
there, all countries of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), except Luxembourg, activated excessive deficit 
procedures (EDP).  
In another vein, the crisis clearly revealed that the 
three pillars of the EMU—a ban on rescuing other states, 
a ban on the monetization of public debt and the Stability 
and Growth Pact (Treaty of Maastricht)—have proved a 
failure. The first two were violated as it was necessary to 
have mechanisms that would help countries with serious 
debt problems, and only the third became a reality but 
not until 2012. 
In this regard, there have been various factors that 
have negatively affected the economic outlook, mainly, 
the lack of European policies for recovery, the volatility 
of international financial markets and the slow adoption 
of agreements. For example, the so-called “fiscal pact”; 
this gives the EU a new framework for fiscal discipline 
and stability that must be incorporated into the laws of 
each country. 
According to forecasts by the European Commission 
(EC), the ratio of public debt to GDP in EMU countries 
will be around 85% in 2013, compared to 60% in 2007 
[4]. And while it is true that these percentages are not 
very different from what is observed in other periods, a 
fundamental difference should be noted however: the 
starting point of public debt. Indeed, Spain started from a 
relatively low level, not exceeding 36% of GDP in 2007, 
while it also enjoyed a very favourable situation from the 
point of view of revenue with a nominal GDP growth 
rate of 8%. However, the significant declines in the col- 
lection of the most considerable taxes for the economic 
cycle-up to 63% in corporate tax (CT) and 13% in the 
value added tax (VAT), in spite of a rate increase in the 
2010 general budget—along with discretionary expan-
sion measures beyond automatic stabilizers, led to the 
change in just two years (2008-2009) of 20,066 million 
euros in surplus in 2007 to −117,630 million euros in 
deficit, though fiscal consolidation measures adopted in 
2010 reduced the deficit to −98,227 million euros.  
2. The Evolution of Government Revenue 
and Expenditure 
As shown in Table 1, until 2006 the economic situation 
enabled the rates of growth of government revenue to be 
well above the rate of spending, mainly due to the growth 
of taxes (in greater measure, taxes on production and 
imports) [5-7]. In 2010, the negative rate in spending 
reflected the beginning of the fiscal consolidation proc-
ess2, while the rate of social security benefits on total 
expenditures peaked in the decade because of the dete-
rioration of the labour market.  
In turn, the expansionary measures taken in the two- 
year period of 2007-20083 had a reflex in the govern- 
ment’s disposable revenue, as shown by the negative 
rates in Table 2. In relation to families, the effect could 
already be seen from 2009, coinciding with the intense 
adjustment in domestic demand, with a negative varia- 
tion of a 6% magnitude compared to 2008 and an em- 
ployment loss rate of 6.6% over the previous year, al- 
though part of that expansive impulse, given the uncer- 
tain environment, resulted in a higher household saving 
rate4. With the onset of the path to fiscal consolidation in 
2010, the data also show that families had a negative rate 
in the same year.  
Certainly, the discretionary fiscal actions prematurely 
exhausted the ability for fiscal manoeuvring and efficient 
mechanisms were not designed to adjust the negative 
trend in disposable income. Countercyclical measures 
adopted in the first period of the current crisis did not 
have a neutral effect on the extent of debt of the Spanish 
economy, but revealed errors in the power of fiscal pol- 
icy. 
2.1. The Behaviour of Non-Interest Revenue 
T   he crisis, which began to intensify as of 2008, has been  
2Royal Decree-Law 8/2010, of 20 May, which gives extraordinary 
measures to reduce the deficit, by the Spanish Government [8]. 
3Expansionary fiscal measures in the field of revenue and expenditure 
are described in other sections of the same subsequent study. 
4According to data from the Bank of Spain and the Ministry of Econ-
omy and Competitiveness [9,10], the savings rate of Spanish house-
holds experienced very intense changes: an increase of 7 percentage 
points (pp) between 2007 and 2009 and a decline of 5 percentage points 
since early 2010 until today. In turn, the savings rate fell from 10.4% in 
2007 and 17.8% in 2009 to 13.1% in 2010. 1Approved by the Council of Europe on 12th December 2008. 
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Table 1. Government income and expenditure. 
Government Spending Government Revenue 
Years 
Absolute values Annual rate Absolute values Annual rate 
Difference between 
percentage changes, 
revenue and expenses 
Percentage of social 
security benefits on 
costs 
1995 197,084 --- 167,994 --- --- 30.9% 
1996 202,918 2.9% 179,928 7.1% 4.1% 31.5% 
1997 206,524 1.8% 190,807 6.1% 4.3% 31.8% 
1998 218,375 5.8% 202,353 6.1% 0.3% 30.8% 
1999 227,329 4.2% 220,648 9.1% 4.9% 30.8% 
2000 246,890 8.6% 240,869 9.1% 0.5% 30.6% 
2001 263,036 6.5% 259,327 7.7% 1.1% 30.4% 
2002 283,741 7.9% 282,019 8.8% 0.9% 30.4% 
2003 300,783 6.0% 297,884 5.6% −0.4% 30.5% 
2004 327,161 8.8% 326,097 9.5% 0.7% 30.2% 
2005 349,501 6.8% 361,005 10.7% 3.9% 30.2% 
2006 377,958 8.1% 401,304 11.2% 3.0% 29.8% 
2007 412,963 9.3% 433,209 8.0% −1.3% 29.7% 
2008 450,948 9.2% 402,078 −7.2% −16.4% 30.2% 
2009 484,759 7.5% 367,661 −8.6% −16.1% 31.7% 
2010 479,645 −1.1% 381,427 3.7% 4.8% 33.6% 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Spanish National Accounts. 
 
Table 2. Disposable income growth rates. 
Years Economy Total Families and NPISHs Governments
2000 -- -- -- 
2001 6.70% 6.60% 10.40% 
2002 6.90% 6.00% 9.80% 
2003 6.90% 6.40% 8.30% 
2004 6.50% 6.80% 10.30% 
2005 7.20% 7.70% 14.70% 
2006 7.30% 6.90% 14.80% 
2007 6.00% 6.00% 10.80% 
2008 1.90% 6.10% −17.40% 
2009 −3.30% 2.00% −27.20% 
2010 1.70% −2.00% 4.20% 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Spanish National Accounts. 
 
having a clearly negative impact on government revenue, 
especially in the two-year period of 2008-2009, due to 
both the decline in tax revenues caused by decisions of 
regulatory change in the field of revenues5 as well as the 
overall economic structure. Since then, this has meant 
that government revenues (RNIR) have been suffering a 
greater impact than the change in GDP in nominal terms 
(RCGDP), as seen in Figure 1.  
In 2007-2010, revenue from direct and indirect taxa- 
tion fell at an annual rate of 5.9% cumulative [5], 2009 
being the year of the greatest impact in absolute decline. 
Specifically, the decline experienced between 2008 and 
2009—17% in 2008 and 28% in 2007—was the result of 
the sharp economic downturn due to the increase in un- 
employment, the decrease in sales and imports, and re- 
strictions on credit, among other causes. But also fiscal 
policy decisions taken by the State Government in 2007 
—in personal income tax and corporate tax6, with direct 
impact on income in later years—and in 2008. In particu- 
lar, the latter were intended to stimulate private con- 
sumption and ultimately, boost the economy. However, 
not only did they not achieve their goal, but they caused 
the opposite effect, since the elasticity of consumption 
was lower than predicted by the Executive, so that gov- 
ernment revenues did not grow as estimated7. Table 3 
shows the negative evolution of tax revenues by section 
and the impact of measures taken on indirect taxes in 
009, which were higher than the direct ones.  2    5Law 35/2007, of 15 November, which establishes the tax credit for 
birth or adoption in the Income Tax of Individuals and the economic 
benefit of a single payment by Social Security for birth or adoption; 
Royal Decree 2/2008, of 21 April, on measures to boost economic 
activity; Law 4/2008, of 23 December, which abolishes the wealth tax, 
widens the monthly refund system in the value added tax, and intro-
duces other changes in tax regulations. All of them by the Spanish 
Government [8].  
6Law 35/2006, of November 28, on Personal Income Tax and partially 
amending the laws on corporate taxes, on the income of non-residents 
and on capital, by the Spanish Government [8]. 
7According to the settlement of the Government Budget in 2008 pro-
vided by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, revenues from taxes on 
income suffered a drop of 14,606 million euros with regards to the 
initial budget [5,6,9]. 
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Table 3. Government total tax revenue. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Item I 69,367 75,187 88,631 101,596 119,979 101,012 86,461 85,827 
Item II 59,601 64,514 70,706 76,261 78,861 70,677 55,655 71,893 
Items I, II and III 130,176 140,854 160,705 179,380 200,676 173,453 144,023 159,536 
Annual tax  8.20 14.09 11.62 11.87 −13.57 −16.97 10.77 
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Figure 1. Evolution of the growth rates of GDP and non- 
interest revenue in nominal terms (1995-2010). Source: 
Calculations based on data from the Spanish National Ac-
counts. 
 
In 2010, however, there was a trend change as a result 
of the elimination of the measures undertaken in previous 
years and the incorporation of new measures for the cor- 
rection of the public deficit; an increase that was basi- 
cally due to the increase in revenues from VAT with 
15,519 million euros.  
2.2. Evolution of the Tax Burden 
From another perspective, the expansionary impulse of 
the first period of the crisis has changed the trend in the 
tax burden in recent years—calculated as the ratio be- 
tween the ratio of the sum of taxes (direct and indirect), 
plus social security contributions to GDP—as can be 
seen in Table 4. In the statistical series for the decade of 
2000-2010, we see a change from 2007, when its propen- 
sity for lowering was altered, especially in 2009. 
To interpret this scenario we must take into considera- 
tion that the evolution of this indicator was in line with 
the economic cycle: in times of economic growth, it is 
known that the level of tax revenue usually grows due to 
the dynamism of the economy and the progressive tax 
system; whereas in times of recession it falls faster than 
economic activity. In this sense, we can say that, first, the 
change in GDP in market prices was positive, except for 
the year 2009, which revealed the harshness of the crisis. 
Second, that the change in GDP showed values lower  
Table 4. Tax burden and variation elasticity in tax revenue 








2000 34.54%    
2001 34.18% 8.02% 6.89% 0.851 
2002 34.84% 7.18% 9.26% 1.265 
2003 34.43% 7.38% 6.10% 0.981 
2004 35.24% 7.43% 9.96% 1.193 
2005 36.32% 8.08% 11.40% 1.390 
2006 37.19% 8.39% 10.98% 1.316 
2007 37.58% 6.86% 8.00% 1.278 
2008 33.67% 3.28% −7.48% −2.098 
2009 31.84% −3.67% −8.91% 3.099 
2010 33.15% 0.34% 4.49% 4.954 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Spanish National Accounts. 
 
than the variation in tax revenues, especially from 2002, 
when a recovery cycle began. 
However, this same reasoning could not be sustained 
after 2008: the ratio of the change in tax revenue over the 
change in GDP (“tax collection elasticity coefficient”) 
changed direction. In 2008, with GDP growth due to the 
rise in the consumer price index (CPI), there was a sig- 
nificant decrease in tax revenue (both taxes on produc- 
tion and imports such as the current taxes on income and 
wealth), which continued declining in 2009, although in 
2010, before a slight rebound in GDP, there was a per- 
centage increase, not in absolute terms, much higher than 
in previous years, mainly due to the behaviour of indirect 
taxation. 
2.3. Final Consumption Investment and  
Expenditure 
With regard to the behaviour of government expenditures 
(FC), we can see an analysis of the “final consumption 
expenditure” as a measure of collective consumption as 
well as corporate transfers of goods and services by the 
government and “gross fixed capital formation”8 as a 
measure of public investment (GFCF)—Figure 2—as  
8As defined in ESA95 (European System of National and Regional 
Accounts 1995). 
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Figure 2. The evolution of final consumption and govern-
ment investment and borrowing in real terms (1995-2010). 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Spanish Na-
tional Accounts. 
 
well as how in absolute terms, and in real terms, the trend 
of the series of final consumption expenditure was in- 
creasing throughout the period of 1995-2009, showing a 
slight change in 2010 due to the start of the path of defi- 
cit reduction.  
The growth in the years 2008 and 2009 was due in part 
to the implementation of expansionary measures from 
expenditures9, in order to boost employment and restruc- 
ture the financial system. In contrast, public investment 
altered its upward trend, albeit lower, as of 2008, while 
the need to finance10 grew further after the 2008, as a 
result of the significant drop in government revenues.  
The growth in the government’s final consumption 
(FC) is not the only factor in the growth of borrowing (B), 
since, the increase of final consumption does not corre- 
spond to the increase in debit, which changed with the 
evolution of non-interest revenue (NIR). Additionally, as 
seen from a different perspective in Figure 3, when ana- 
lysing the variation from year to year in absolute values 
from 2007 to 2009 the consumption behaviour (CB) was 
contrary to the GDP pattern (GDPP) and public deficit 
(PD). 
From another perspective, Figure 4, shows how, the 
rates of change for final consumption expenditure 
(RCFCE) exceeded those for GDP (RCGDP) starting in 
2002. At the same time, we can see how from 2007 gov- 
ernment consumption grew while GDP decreased, al- 
though the government investment (GI) had, in the same 
interval, presented cyclical behaviour with a significant 
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Figure 3. Variation from year to year in absolute values of 
the government’s final consumption, GDP, non-interest 
revenue and borrowing (1995-2010). Source: Calculations 





















Figure 4. Variation rates for GDP, investment and govern-
ment final consumption (1995-2010). Source: Calculations 
based on data from the Spanish National Accounts. 
 
If we divide the time interval analysed in three stages 
we can observe that (Table 5), first; the average rate of 
change of final consumption expenditure grew, while the 
corresponding for the gross fixed capital formation de- 
creased in the third stage, coinciding with the period of 
crisis, after experiencing a significant increase in the sec- 
ond stage, that is to say, the period of expansion. Sec- 
ondly, we can also see that the average participation for 
final consumption expenditure to GDP reached 20.5% in 
the crisis period. 
2.4. Quantification of the Expansionary  
Measures during the Period of 2007-2010 
9Royal Decree Law 9/2008, of 28 November, which creates a Local 
Investment Fund and a Special State Fund for the Revitalization of the 
Economy and Employment as well as extraordinary credits that can be 
approved to meet their financing; and Royal Decree Law 9/2009, of 26 
June on bank restructuring and strengthening the resources of credit 
institutions, which creates the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring 
(FOBR). All of them by the Spanish Government [8]. 
10According to National Accounts data provided by the Bank of Spain.
From 2007 to 2010, the impact on tax revenues from 
regulatory changes resulted in collecting fewer resources 
estimated at over 20,000 million euros, as shown in Ta- 
ble 6. In particular, in 2008 the lower revenue (71.8%) 
were due to both the regulatory changes introduced in 
2007 in the structure of the main taxes (income tax,  
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Table 5. Average rate changes for GDP, final consumption 
and government fixed capital gross formation in stages. 









5.1% 7.9% 4.1% 17.7% 
Crisis period 
2008-2010 
5.7% 1.1% 1.3% 20.5% 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Spanish National Accounts. 
 
Table 6. Quantification of regulatory changes (I). 





−8,620 (−3,490 from the  
regulatory changes in 2007) 
−3,045 3,491  
Corporate 
tax 
−8,120 (−5,220 from the  
regulatory changes in 2007) 
1,600 −551  
VAT −2,800 −6,550 2,010  
Excise tax  850 1,190  
Total −19,540 −7,145 6,140 −20,545
Source: Calculations based on data from the Spanish Tax Agency. *In 2011 
only data up to November is considered. 
 
corporate tax and VAT), aimed at injecting resources at 
both businesses and families (amid falling corporate 
profits and the contraction in consumption), as well as 
deferrals for tax debts due to the lack of liquidity in the 
system. 
By contrast, in 2009, as shown in Table 7, most of the 
revenue loss was due to a sharp decline in economic ac- 
tivity and, consequently, the significant decline in em- 
ployment as well as profits and revenue, which also 
negatively impacted the settlements of major taxes from 
the previous year. 
In short, the package of expansionary fiscal measures 
in the field of revenue not only failed to suit the eco-
nomic times that were already experiencing a serious 
deterioration in the labour market but they also were not 
designed to have a significant impact in a shift of the 
economic growth pattern, subject to hegemony until then 
by the property sector. Moreover, in 2008 the tax reforms 
on direct taxes (income tax and corporate tax) became 
noticeable, which were adopted in 2007, during an eco- 
nomic expansionary cycle. 
The stimulus policies that were deployed for expendi- 
tures in 2008 and 2009, estimated at 23,701 million euros 
—of which 11,150 million correspond to local invest-
ment funds and for the revitalization of the economy and 
employment—aimed at achieving a more balanced grow- 
th in the long term11 and to contribute to the restructuring 
of the financial system. 
Table 7. Quantification of regulatory changes (II). 
 2008  2009  2010
Tax revenue variation −27,223  −29,430  15,513
Share in regulatory 
changes in 2007 
−8,710 32.0%    
Share in regulatory 
changes in 2007 
−10,830 39.8% −7,145 24.3% 6,140
Variation not due to 
regulatory changes 
−7,683 28.2% −22,285 75.7%  
Source: Calculations based on data from the Spanish Tax Agency. 
 
In another vein, the determination of its countercycli- 
cal effect or otherwise is relevant for determining its na- 
ture. Specifically, it is desirable to consider whether in 
relation to resources for local and revitalization funds, 
the 60,000 projects carried out can be considered an in- 
vestment itself, since, as we will see in the modelling for 
public spending and in line with many empirical studies, 
the relationship between public spending and GDP is 
negative, whereas it is positive if we only consider 
spending on investment.  
3. Public Sector Countercyclical Capacity  
We can see from the analysis that was carried out that the 
fiscal policy adopted resulted in a reduction of the tax 
burden, which did not reverse the economic recovery. 
However it did result in a rapid increase in the deficit and 
public debt, as well as prematurely depleting fiscal space 
to address random cyclical situations.  
Seeing this, in the current climate of intensifying sov- 
ereign debt crisis and the application of fiscal consolida- 
tion policies [11], along with forecasts of decline—by the 
EC and other international bodies—and facing the diffi- 
culties of correcting fiscal dynamics in the economic 
framework, everything seems to indicate that the recov- 
ery of the deficit figures and public debt will continue to 
require strenuous efforts, especially from the standpoint 
of public spending. Moreover, if we take in account that 
the prospects in the short and medium term are based on 
the development of foreign trade, we can predict that the 
recovery of tax revenues will be moderate.  
Therefore, the design of structural reforms in taxation 
favouring sectors that stimulate the economy and create 
jobs is deemed necessary, even if it is another object of 
detailed discussion [12]. Additionally, these reforms are 
necessary given the rising unemployment figures, the 
adoption of mechanisms to equitably distribute the tax 
burden and not aggravate the tax burden only on em- 
ployees and middle class12, so as to maintain a dual sys- 
12According to Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Commis-
sion responsible for producing data on the European Union, the Gini
coefficient, a measure of inequality, has grown dramatically in Spain in 
the last four years. It has increased from 31.3 in 2008 to 34 in the latest 
data compiled [4]. 11A reasoning that appeared in the 2010 General State Budget. 
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tem of taxation on both labour income and on capital 
income. 
Moreover, given the challenges facing the Spanish 
economy and, especially, facing the austerity mandate 
derived from the reform of Article 135 of the Spanish 
Constitution (SC), which brings about the requirement of 
adapting public accounts to a stability principle, another 
necessary debate has surfaced. This debate revolves 
around the Public Sector, or in other words, around the 
nature of aggregate public spending. Not surprisingly, 
this is a major issue, since its varying dimension affects 
the level of production, employment and welfare and in 
this sense, there have been many studies that have fo- 
cused on the impact of the public sector in the economy.  
3.1. Public Expenditure and Economic Growth 
In order to analyse the effects of public spending on the 
aggregate growth rate, and in particular, look for evi- 
dence of whether the evolution, that changes depending 
the period, of public consumption items that may have 
had an impact on economic growth, we have used a mul- 
tivariate model that enables addressing issues dynami- 
cally and feedback between variables (for possible bidi- 
rectional links)13. Our decision to use only spending and 
government investment as explanatory variables is due to 
the fact that this paper aims to test the suitability of pub- 
lic policies to indiscriminately reduce current public 
consumption. 
Various empirical studies agree that the relationship 
between government spending and GDP is negative, ex- 
cept if we exclusively consider the investment in public 
infrastructure and education spending items [13-20]. 
However, it is true that, in parallel, other authors suggest 
the opposite, disputing the results obtained on the basis 
of methodological problems or sample selection (Keefer 
and Knack (1997)14. Additionally, others who have been 
inspired by endogenous growth models and focused on 
productive public expenditure, have analysed and quanti-
fied the effects of infrastructure public capital on GDP 
and the economic growth of a territory using the meth-
odology developed by Aschauer (1989) [13,21-27], con-
sisting of adjustment according to aggregate production, 
from which we obtain the “total productivity factor” 
(TPF), which is considered a dependent variable in re-
gression with public capital, facilitates “the quantifica-
tion of the percentage of GDP variation at constant per-
centage increases in public capital”. 
Be that as it may, what matters is that a difference of 
opinion persists when it comes to estimating this elastic- 
ity, whether due to the series used, or due to specific 
econometric methodology. So, in other studies that use 
vector autoregressive models called (VAR) [27], the re- 
sults in many cases are even contradictory. Studies using 
general equilibrium models [28-31] reveal elasticity val- 
ues that show the level of production with respect to pub- 
lic capital that are very different from those obtained 
from the aggregate production estimate. 
Therefore, in the context of that debate, and taking as a 
measure the public sector size of the “final consumption 
expenditure of the government according to ESA-95” 
from the past 15 years, this work seeks to analyse their 
impact on GDP, as well as determine whether growth 
and government spending invested through “government 
fixed gross capital formation”15 presents a different be- 
haviour. On the basis of the results obtained we will not 
only be able to assess the ability of countercyclical fiscal 
policy in recent years, but also the possibility of estimat- 
ing future behaviour. 
3.2. Equilibrium Relationship between the Final 
Consumption of the Government and GDP 
From here on, to analyse whether the evolution in the 
time of public spending has been able to have an impact 
on economic growth, it is worth studying whether there 
is, from an econometric point of view, a long term stable 
equilibrium relationship between government spending 
and GDP. To accomplish this, we will propose a bivari- 
ate relationship model, valid for future predictions. 
Methodologically, we analyse the presence of cointegra- 
tion [32] between the two series to estimate a model for 
error correction for cointegrated nonstationary series. 
Thus, based on the data provided by the Quarterly Na- 
tional Accounts, which provides final consumption ex- 
penditure quarterly series aggregate of the general gov- 
ernment and of the GDP, in real terms for the period of 
1995-2010 (base 2000), we see that, by trend, it deals 
with two nonstationary series in mean and variance 
(Figure 5). Thus, in order to correct the “nonstationar- 
ity”16 in variance, we will work with the series in loga- 
rithms17.  
15The data used are limited to the period from 2000 to 2010, with quar-
terly periodicity, as available in the National Statistics Institute [7]. 
16The nonstationarity of the time series is a problem that could generate 
spurious regressions. This does not allow the use of large sample theory 
to validate estimation and inference in the linear model. From an eco-
nomic standpoint, the presence of unit roots means that the effect of a 
stock last forever, therefore cyclical fluctuations cannot be studied 
separately from the long-term components, besides the long-term trends 
not being fixed. 
17Previously, we conducted an intervention analysis of the series for 
aggregate public spending and GDP, modelling data that are considered 
abnormal or extreme due to its magnitude. 
13This would help us try to overcome the criticism about the possible 
presence of reverse causality or endogeneity of government spending 
on aggregate output. 
14According to their argument, the selection of the sample and the 
method can determine the outcome, so that the use of data from rich 
countries leads to supporting a negative relationship between public 
spending and growth and the opposite if the sample comes from poor 
countries. 
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Figure 5. Evolution of general government spending and 
GDP (quarterly data). Source: Calculations based on data 
from the Spanish National Accounts. 
 
By means of tests from augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(1988) and Phillips-Perron18 (1988) [33,34], we con-
trasted the hypothesis of “non-stationarity” of the series 
in logarithms. For this purpose, it is necessary to differ-
entiate the series in the regular and seasonal part, con-
cluding that they are integrated from order 2, I (2): 
1t tlogy logy t   
 
 where  is stationary, i.e. 2 tlogy
 02~ 2 (1 )logy I l  ~ogy It t
For its part, the Granger causality test (1969) [35-37] 
(Annex result 1) shows that the hypothesis accepts that 
“FC does not cause at the Granger at the GDP” and reject 
the hypothesis that “GDP does not cause FC”. That is to 
say, delayed values in FC have a significant impact on 
aggregate output. While it is necessary to consider 
whether a cointegration relationship exists between the 
two variables, given that we have to take into account the 
possible existence of long-term relationships, this test 
helps establish the endogeneity of VAR variables [38].  
. 
Through a cointegration analysis, as a step prior to se- 
ries bivariate modelling, the existence of a stable equilib- 
rium relationship is checked between long-term time 
trends in public spending and GDP. The Johansen test 
(1988,1991) [35,39-41] (Annex 2 outcome) indicates the 
existence of a cointegration relationship between the 
variables, assuming a model with a constant term in the 
equation of integration and four lags to employ19. Once 
the cointegrating range is identified the VAR (Vector 
autoregression) model is estimated with cointegrating 
vectors (VEC) [21]. This model incorporates three dum- 
my variables20, obtained from the intervention analysis of 
the series in its univariate modelling process. The result 
of the joint model21 with the multivariate error mecha-
nism (VAR-ECM)22 indicates that it is significant and 
bidirectional (as shown in Annex 2 of the result). We 
must warn that GDP and CF variables are closely linked 
in the long run and also interact with each other in the 
short term, as shown in Table 8.  
In the estimated model, the cointegration equation 
1 10.81 3.74t tLGDP LFC    , shows that in the long- 
term positive sign of FC follows the theoretical postulate 
and reflects the adjustment of the final spending expen- 
diture, while the estimated and significant coefficients 
for the speed of adjustment of each of the equations with 
respect to the relationship of the long-term equilibrium 
identified 1 = 0.151 and 2 = 0.289, show that the two 
series are affected by deviations from this relationship. 
Then the impulse response functions or the decompo- 
sition of the forecast error variance for each series ex- 
amine the effects of a pulse induced on each of the vari- 
ables, as well as the percentage that each series contrib- 
utes to the typical deviation of another. Table 9 shows 
how that before an increase in the growth rate of FC 
(0.007225), in the following quarter the effect on GDP 
growth rate is zero, and how from the second quarter an 
increasing negative effect is produced (−0.000634), 
which is extended over the periods. Additionally, with a 
GDP growth rate (0.005987), in the following quarter we 
observe a positive effect on FC growth (0.004563). How- 
ever, the relationship is opposite from the second quarter. 
The explained variance of the rate of GDP, according 
to the results displayed in Table 10, is developed by its 
own dynamics. From the second quarter it increases its 
contribution to the standard deviation of the prediction 
error of the FC rate, exceeding 50% (51.93308) after 8 
quarters. As for the rate of FC, the share of GDP rate in 
the standard deviation of the prediction error decreases as 
of the second quarter. 
The main conclusion given by the model of behaviour 
for the final consumption expenditure of general gov- 
ernment and GDP, which is in line with many studies, is 
the existence of delayed adverse effects on the rate of 
growth of public spending on growth rate GDP. By the 
response function of GDP for a boost in public consump- 
tion, we estimate that with a lag of two years, an increase 
in the growth rate of public consumption is falling in the 
rates of change of aggregate output of −0.006446 pp. The 
iscal policy response is greater the higher the temporal  f  
21The model residuals have a white noise structure. From the diagnostic 
tests to the model errors, we conclude that there is normality in the 
model (Jarque-Bera test), without autocorrelation problems (Lagrange 
Multiplier test) and no problems in the heteroscedasticity model (White 
test for uncrossed terms). 
22The error correction model VEC correctly represents the dynamic 
behaviour of the model series and expresses this change in the depend-
ent variable as a linear function of changes in the explanatory variables 
and the error correction term. 
18A more general contrast than the augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
(Dickey-Fuller 1988) whereby an AR(p) process is followed, although 
it is not necessarily considered a white noise, but allows it to be an 
ARMA or a process with heteroscedasticity. 
19According to the criteria of Akaike and Schwarz. 
20FIC1, is the dummy variable that assigns value 1 for the period 
2009Q2-2009Q4, FIC2, to period 2008Q1 and FIC3 to period 1998Q1.
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Table 8. Estimated VEC model. 
 1 1 1
2 3 4
1 2 3
0.151 0.81 3.74 0.71 0.56
                          0.52 0.22 0.03
                          0.08 0.09 0.007




LGDP LGDP LFC LGDP
LGDP LGDP LGDP




        
     
      
                       0.003 1 0.02 2 0.03 3 0.022FIC FIC FIC      

 
 1 1 1
2 3 4
1 2 3
0.289 0.81 3.74 1.18 1.03
                         1.14 0.06 0.37
                         0.19 0.32 0.11
      
t t t t
t t t
t t t
LFC LGDP LFC LGDP
LGDP LGDP LGDP




        
     
      
                   0.01 1 0.008 2 0.01 3 0.026FIC FIC FIC      
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Source: Eviews, with constant term in the cointegrating equation. 
 
Table 9. Induced impulse effects. 
 LGDP Response LFC Response 
Period LGDP LFC LGDP LFC 
1 0.005987 0.000000 0.004563 0.007225 
2 0.002233 −0.000634 −0.000148 0.008255 
3 0.001348 −0.001849 −0.002095 0.008711 
4 0.001295 −0.002723 −0.003298 0.010967 
5 0.006275 −0.002936 0.000865 0.012760 
6 0.003690 −0.003963 −0.001948 0.012917 
7 0.003034 −0.005450 −0.003258 0.012485 
8 0.002981 −0.006446 −0.003687 0.011847 
Source: Eviews, with constant term in the cointegrating equation. 
 
Table 10. Variance decomposition. 
 LGDP Variance Decomposition LFC Variance Decomposition 
Period S.E. LGDP LFC S.E. LGDP LFC 
1 0.005987 100.0000 0.000000 0.008545 28.51729 71.48271 
2 0.006421 99.02551 0.974493 0.011882 14.76513 85.23487 
3 0.006817 91.78104 8.218956 0.014881 11.39553 88.60447 
4 0.007454 79.77827 20.22173 0.018778 10.24187 89.75813 
5 0.010176 80.82731 19.17269 0.022719 7.141547 92.85845 
6 0.011528 73.23790 26.76210 0.026207 5.919661 94.08034 
7 0.013107 62.00904 37.99096 0.029211 6.008359 93.99164 
8 0.014908 51.93308 48.06692 0.031737 6.439859 93.56014 
Source: Eviews, with constant term in the cointegrating equation. 
 
frequency due to the institutional inertia that exists in the 
public sector.  
By extrapolating these results we would be able to ac- 
cept that the increase in public spending during the 
2008-2009 period is higher than the average of the past 
15 years. As shown by the annual growth rates in Table 
11, it has not positively affected GDP growth. Thus, con- 
cerning aggregate, the discretionary expansionary meas- 
ures implemented throughout the initial years of the cri- 
sis from the standpoint of public expenditure had a du- 
bious role in their stabilizing effect. 
3.3. Equilibrium Relationship between Public 
Investment and GDP 
As already noted, studies agree that public investment is 
a positive factor for economic growth and in this sense,  
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Table 11. General government rates of growth in final consumption expenditure by component, in current terms (1995-2010). 
 
Goods and services produced by 
the general government 
Acquisitions without transformation for social transfers  
in kind 
Total expenditure in final 
spending 
1995 -- -- -- 
1996 2.6% 4.3% 2.8% 
1997 0.0% 1.2% 0.2% 
1998 0.3% 12.2% 1.8% 
1999 1.3% 7.4% 2.2% 
2000 5.3% −1.9% 4.2% 
2001 3.4% 4.6% 3.6% 
2002 4.5% 8.6% 5.0% 
2003 5.9% 1.3% 5.3% 
2004 6.2% 9.9% 6.7% 
2005 5.3% 6.5% 5.5% 
2006 3.7% 7.6% 4.3% 
2007 6.8% −3.9% 5.2% 
2008 8.7% 9.7% 8.9% 
2009 8.8% 13.8% 9.5% 
2010 −0.9% 0.9% −0.7% 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Spanish Tax Agency. 
 
we analysed the impact of public investment by govern- 
ment—gross fixed capital formation by government 
(GFCF)23—on economic growth through a new bivariate 
model24. The result of the estimate enables us to assert 
that GDP and GFCF are closely related variables in the 
long run, which in turn interact with each other in the 
short term (Annex 4 - 6 outcome), and therefore it is a 
model that also allows us to anticipate behaviours. As re- 
gards the aggregate level, in line with the results offered 
by empirical literature, a positive relationship is clearly 
seen between public investment and economic growth. 
Specifically, it appears that the effects of a decline in 
public investment by government on GDP, debated by 
the impulse response functions of Table 12, are negative 
on economic growth. Faced with a reduction in the rate 
of GFCF, and a lag of two years, a reduction in the rate 
of change of GDP resulted: −0.005853 pp.  
In view of these results we can deduce that the delayed 
effects of the rate of decline in public investment had a 
negative impact on economic growth. In this regard, 
some of the expansionary measures taken during the 
years 2008 and 2009 aimed at public investment by the 
government, using the second estimated model, repre- 
sented a positive effect on future GDP. However, the 
reduction in GFCF that began in 2010, as a measure of  
Table 12. Induced impulse effects. 
 LGDP Response L GFCF Response 
Period LGDP L GFCF LGDP L GFCF 
1 0.007802 0.000000 −0.046121 0.077470
2 0.006017 −0.001960 −0.036761 0.010742
3 0.005684 −0.002833 −0.051604 −0.005901
4 0.006830 −0.003121 −0.022152 −0.005962
5 0.011934 −0.003169 −0.015586 0.069998
6 0.012003 −0.004733 −0.002148 0.002305
7 0.011681 −0.005537 −0.050194 −0.012957
8 0.012866 −0.005853 −0.022963 −0.012259
Source: Eviews, with constant term in the cointegrating equation. 
 
fiscal consolidation, will have a negative impact on fu- 
ture economic growth. This coupled with the growth of 
general government final expenditure that occurred in the 
early years of the crisis, as deduced from the first model 
estimated, may have negatively affected the growth of 
aggregate output.  
We can affirm that in the process of fiscal consolida- 
tion and in future actions, it would be necessary to 
deepen the analysis of government expenditure items on 
a more disaggregated level. This would be based, for 
example, on determining a functional classification to 
analyse its impact on aggregate output and therefore pri- 
oritize the items that generate a positive impact on eco- 
23The period considered begins in the first quarter of 2000, in the ab-
sence of previous data on a quarterly basis [7]. 
24We followed the same procedure used for the previous methodology-
cal model and checked that the model residuals have a white noise 
structure. 
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nomic growth. These findings are often used as an argu- 
ment in favour of restructuring public expenditure to 
increase the proportion of public investment to the det- 
riment of public consumption. 
4. Conclusions 
From the analysis of the evolution of revenue and expen- 
diture over the past 15 years, we see that from 2007 the 
differential growth rates between the two is negative: 1) 
due to the impact of the economic crisis, which clearly 
reduced revenues and increased general government 
consumption in the face of GDP decreases, and 2) a set 
of measures for expansionary economic policy adopted 
between 2007 and 2009, estimated at 44,146 million eu- 
ros. 
The use of fiscal policy beyond automatic stabilizers 
overflowed the deficit and public debt during that period, 
thus highlighting the existence of weaknesses in institu- 
tional performance: 1) to overestimate the scope to im- 
plement countercyclical measures and resulting insuffi- 
cient contexts for fiscal discipline and 2) the existence of 
faults detected in the analysis of the ability of fiscal pol- 
icy, due to increased interest payments and the disap- 
pearance of the windfall in the real estate sector.  
We have analysed the situation that displays the deple- 
tion fiscal space, and due to the short-term objective of 
the Spanish economy to adapt budgetary policy to the 
stability policy, and once adjudicated the effects of ag- 
gregate public spending and its composition as an in- 
strument of fiscal policy. Thus, through the development 
of two bivariate relationship models that cointegrate (and 
that anticipate the effect on the evolution of the Spanish 
economy), we have evaluated the impact of the final 
consumption expenditure of the general government and 
public investment on GDP, with the objective of analys- 
ing the role of fiscal policy implemented in the early 
years of the crisis and predict future behaviour, thus we 
can say that: 1) starting from the first model, the growth 
of public spending has had a positive impact on GDP, 
despite some of the measures for public investment by 
the government, 2) taking the second model, some of 
these measures have had a positive impact, but, con- 
versely, we should note that a significant reduction in 
public investment, a result of the tax consolidation proc- 
ess, will have negative effects on future economic 
growth.  
Hence in the future, the focus should be on action by 
government in production investments that in the me- 
dium to long term contribute to a real change of eco- 
nomic growth model, based mainly on industry and value 
added, and which allows some stability in government 
revenue. And secondly, it seems advisable to develop 
efficient mechanisms for monitoring and controlling the 
budget to focus on efforts to reduce the deficit and public 
debt in items that minimize their impact on economic 
growth. 
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Annex 
Outcome 1 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1995Q1 2010Q4  
Lags: 4   
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
D4GDP does not Granger Cause D4FC 54 7.43893 0.0001 
D4FC does not Granger Cause D4GDP 1.12056 0.3587 
Post. The test is performed with the two stationary series. By transforming the series in logarithms, solves the stationarity 
series variance but still show a linear trend, therefore, become stationary half twice differentiating the series in logarithms. 
Trend is also observed in the seasonal (analyzing the correlogram) so eventually the series with regular and seasonal dif- 
ferences have stationarity. 
 
Outcome 2 
Sample (adjusted): 1996Q2 2010Q4   
Included observations: 59 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LGDP LFC    
Exogenous series: FIC1 FIC2 FIC3   
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None* 0.367757 27.10396 15.49471 0.0006 
At most 1 0.000908 0.053570 3.841466 0.8169 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegratingeqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
*Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None* 0.367757 27.05039 14.26460 0.0003 
At most 1 0.000908 0.053570 3.841466 0.8169 
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegratingeqn (s) at the 0.05 level 
*Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b’*S11*b = I): 
LGDP LFC    
−51.81879 41.65724    
7.648073 1.358113    
Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):  
D(LGDP) −0.002906 −0.000110   
D(LFC) −0.005587 5.44E-05   
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 440.1040  
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
LGDP LFC    
1.000000 −0.803902    
 (0.02770)    
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(LGDP) 0.150599    
 (0.04039)    
D(LFC) 0.289533    
 (0.05765)    
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Outcome 3 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Sample (adjusted): 1996Q2 2010Q4 
Included observations: 59 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq: Coint Eq1  
LGDP(-1) 1.000000  
LFC(-1) −0.803902  
 (0.02770)  
 [−29.0171]  
C −3.744097  
Error Correction: D(LGDP) D(LFC) 
Coint Eq1 0.150599 0.289533 
 (0.04039) (0.05765) 
 [3.72851] [5.02244] 
D(LGDP(-1)) −0.710764 −1.185101 
 (0.12950) (0.18483) 
 [−5.48854] [−6.41193] 
D(LGDP(-2)) −0.562616 −1.036811 
 (0.18064) (0.25781) 
 [−3.11463] [−4.02158] 
D(LGDP(-3)) −0.525170 −1.143569 
 (0.17681) (0.25235) 
 [−2.97030] [−4.53173] 
D(LGDP(-4)) 0.223450 −0.069778 
 (0.15927) (0.22732) 
 [1.40297] [−0.30696] 
D(LFC(-1)) 0.033326 0.375295 
 (0.09835) (0.14037) 
 [0.33884] [2.67353] 
D(LFC(-2)) −0.083712 0.196977 
 (0.13333) (0.19030) 
 [−0.62784] [1.03508] 
D(LFC(-3)) −0.095606 0.325044 
 (0.13701) (0.19554) 
 [−0.69783] [1.66229] 
D(LFC(-4)) −0.007104 0.116471 
 (0.12437) (0.17751) 
 [−0.05712] [0.65613] 
C 0.022520 0.026885 
 (0.00337) (0.00481) 
 [6.68359] [5.59063] 
FIC1 −0.003755 −0.019555 
 (0.00585) (0.00835) 
 [−0.64216] [−2.34288] 
FIC2 −0.027964 −0.008836 
 (0.00659) (0.00940) 
 [−4.24556] [−0.93995] 
FIC3 −0.035663 −0.010996 
 (0.00676) (0.00965) 
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 [−5.27610] [−1.13981] 
R-squared 0.910253 0.843183 
Adj. R-squared 0.886841 0.802274 
Sum sq. resids 0.001649 0.003359 
S.E. equation 0.005987 0.008545 
F-statistic 38.87951 20.61132 
Log likelihood 225.5947 204.6058 
Akaike AIC −7.206600 −6.495111 
Schwarz SC −6.748837 −6.037348 
Mean dependent 0.007713 0.009586 
S.D. dependent 0.017798 0.019217 
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.87E-09 
Determinant resid covariance 1.14E-09 
Log likelihood 440.1040 
Akaike information criterion −13.96963 
Schwarz criterion −12.98368 
 
Outcome 4 
Date: 10/13/12   Time: 17:43 
Sample: 2000Q1 2010Q4  
Lags: 2   
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
D4GDP does not Granger Cause D4GFCF 37 2.87197 0.0713 
D4GFCF does not Granger Cause D4GDP 0.39815 0.6748 
 
Outcome 5 
Sample (adjusted): 2001Q2 2010Q4   
Included observations: 39 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend (restricted constant) 
Series: LGDP LGFCF    
Exogenous series: FIC   
Warning: Critical values assume no exogenous series  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None* 0.627922 44.49680 20.26184 0.0000 
At most 1 0.141263 5.939402 9.164546 0.1954 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegratingeqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
*Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.627922 38.55740 15.89210 0.0000 
At most 1 0.141263 5.939402 9.164546 0.1954 
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegratingeqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
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*Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b’*S11*b = I): 
LGDP LGFCF C   
−28.82739 18.48931 187.1772   
32.12608 −13.16542 −278.3042   
Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):  
D(LGDP) −0.003743 −0.002285   
D(LGFCF) −0.056297 0.024260   
1 Cointegrating Equation(s): Log likelihood 189.9151  
Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
LGDP LGFCF C   
1.000000 −0.641380 −6.493034   
 (0.03562) (0.32015)   
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(LGDP) 0.107897    
 (0.03601)    
D(LGFCF) 1.622904    
 (0.41619)    
 
Outcome 6 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Sample (adjusted): 2001Q2 2010Q4 
Included observations: 39 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
Cointegrating Eq: Coint Eq1  
LGDP(-1) 1.000000  
LGFCF(-1) −0.641380  
 (0.03562)  
 [−18.0072]  
C −6.493034  
 (0.32015)  
 [−20.2814]  
Error Correction: D(LGDP) D(LGFCF) 
Coint Eq1 0.107897 1.622904 
 (0.03601) (0.41619) 
 [2.99591] [3.89947] 
D(LGDP(-1)) −0.486242 −5.514929 
 (0.19731) (2.28014) 
 [−2.46432] [−2.41868] 
D(LGDP(-2)) −0.458764 −9.620283 
 (0.20213) (2.33583) 
 [−2.26963] [−4.11857] 
D(LGDP(-3)) −0.403250 −8.143107 
 (0.21031) (2.43039) 
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 [−1.91737] [−3.35054] 
D(LGDP(-4)) 0.170175 −3.158577 
 (0.21675) (2.50478) 
 [0.78511] [−1.26102] 
D(LGFCF(-1)) 0.043906 0.179552 
 (0.01873) (0.21643) 
 [2.34428] [0.82960] 
D(LGFCF(-2)) 0.026568 −0.014303 
 (0.01437) (0.16606) 
 [1.84879] [−0.08613] 
D(LGFCF(-3)) 0.010195 −0.300013 
 (0.01090) (0.12601) 
 [0.93493] [−2.38088] 
D(LGFCF(-4)) −0.004263 0.369510 
 (0.00997) (0.11522) 
 [−0.42758] [3.20698] 
FIC −0.013869 −0.227132 
 (0.00611) (0.07058) 
 [−2.27070] [−3.21793] 
R-squared 0.727950 0.995449 
Adj. R-squared 0.643521 0.994037 
Sum sq. resids 0.001765 0.235736 
S.E. equation 0.007802 0.090160 
F-statistic 8.622017 704.8669 
Log likelihood 139.7200 44.27916 
Akaike AIC −6.652308 −1.757906 
Schwarz SC −6.225754 −1.331352 
Mean dependent 0.007990 0.062291 
S.D. dependent 0.013067 1.167583 
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 3.65E-07 
Determinant resid covariance 2.02E-07 
Log likelihood 189.9151 
Akaike information criterion −8.559749 
Schwarz criterion −7.578674 
 
